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Abstract: When designing digital products that millions of people use, User Experience
(UX) practitioners are prone to typical cognitive biases that might threaten the quality
of their work. A barrier for mitigating such biases is the bias blind spot: People are
more likely to detect bias in others than in themselves. Since practitioners have no
standard means to diminish the bias blind spot, this paper investigates the prospect of
implementation intention, designed as a commitment to consider how one evaluates
others when evaluating oneself, as a debiasing intervention. As a preliminary study, an
online experiment was conducted among 123 UX practitioners to examine whether
implementation intention could yield a short-term bias blind spot diminution. The
results suggest that the UX practitioners perceived more cognitive bias in the ‘average
UX practitioner’ than in themselves, and that implementation intention served to
diminish this bias blind spot short-term for novices and experts alike.
Keywords: bias blind spot; debiasing; implementation intention; user experience (UX)
practitioners

1. Introduction
User experience (UX) design is now an integral part of the research-and-development (R&D)
strategy of most major corporations and organizations (Gray et al., 2015). Through a usercentered design approach, UX practitioners develop digital products that convey meaningful
and relevant experiences to millions of users (Norman & Nielsen, 2020), help build brand
loyalty, reduce cost, and increase profit (Kambala, 2019; O’Brien, 2018). These digital
products inform (e.g., news), entertain (e.g., streaming services), stimulate productivity (e.g.,
file-sharing systems), facilitate education (e.g., learning management systems), and keep
track of physical and mental health (e.g., bio-monitoring systems) (Yalanska, 2017). UX is
therefore woven into the digital infrastructure of society.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0
International Licence.
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The impact of UX on our everyday lives entails an ethical responsibility for UX practitioners
(Gray, 2016): They should aim to maximize the perceived benefits of the users they design
for. Human judgment, however, is often distorted by irrational, yet consistent erroneous
tendencies, inclinations, or prejudice. Such systematic error in thinking is called cognitive
bias (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Tversky & Kahneman, 1996; Kahneman, 2012).
Although bias introduces an evolutionary advantage such as quick decision-making in highpressure situations, bias also frequently causes erroneous and inappropriate decisionmaking (Haselton et al., 2009). Diminishing cognitive bias would thus enable UX practitioners
to better avoid such potential errors and, in turn, elevate the quality of their work.
Efforts have been made in the UX professional community to articulate and moderate
cognitive biases (e.g., Subramanian, 2018; Whitenton, 2016; Sun, 2017). In design thinking, a
practical approach has been to address this by involving users and colleagues and, more
generally, by adopting an empathic lens in the design process (e.g., Wright & McCarthy,
2008; Kouprie & Visser 2009; Köppen & Meinel, 2015). Such attempts, however, face a
critical challenge: UX practitioners, just as everyone else, might be subject to a bias blind
spot where “they are less likely to detect bias in themselves than in others” (Scopelliti et al.,
2015, p. 2468). The result is a tendency to ignore where and how one’s own types of bias
could be addressed despite the potentially harmful effects of bias-induced errors during
design-based decision-making. This entails a similar ethical responsibility for design
researchers, namely to provide UX practitioners with the relevant knowledge and the
applicable tools they need to help mitigate this bias blind spot.
A novel and promising debiasing intervention is known as an implementation intention. This
refers to a tailored ‘if-then’ plan specifying a situation and a desired behavior to be
performed, which the person must then commit to (Brandstätter & Gollwitzer, 2001;
Adriaanse et al., 2011). Speculatively, the bias blind spot could thus be targeted simply by
asking UX practitioners to consider how they evaluate others when they evaluate
themselves. If they seriously commit to this debiasing intervention, UX practitioners should
be able to become as aware of the bias in their own decision making as they are about the
bias in others’, thereby effectively mitigating their own bias blind spot. This, however, is
conjecture, since implementation intention has not been studied as a debiasing intervention
for the bias blind spot, neither within nor outside the UX domain.
To address this lacuna, this paper contributes a preliminary study: Can implementation
intention yield a short-term bias blind spot diminution among UX practitioners? Focusing on
short-term effects serves to probe if more extensive research on this topic is warranted. The
paper first expounds this motivational conjecture before reporting on the method and
results of an online experiment among 123 UX practitioners. The paper discusses the results
and limitations and proposes future research on how implementation intention might
mitigate the bias blind spot among UX practitioners both long-term and in-situ.
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2. Theoretical background
2.1 Cognitive bias in UX
UX practitioners must make numerous decisions that affect the quality of the products they
help create––from prioritizing user needs to how form factors, interactions, and content can
support these user needs (Gray, 2016; Gray et al., 2016; Norman & Nielsen, 2020).
Kahneman’s (2003) dual-process theory suggests that people process information via an
intuitive (system 1) and a deliberative system (system 2). System 1 is fast and enables people
to process information automatically and subconsciously, while system 2 is slower and
supports conscious reflection on information (Kahneman, 2003; see also Pennycook et al.,
2016). System 1 relies on shortcuts, so-called heuristics. These cognitive ‘rules of thumb’
help the individual attain a good-enough outcome quickly and without too much effort. The
problem, however, is that heuristics frequently lead to errors in thinking. Their automaticity
renders these errors systematic when relying on system-1 thinking. Such errors are referred
to as cognitive biases (Evans, 2008) and apply to all people in all professions, including UX
practitioners.
External factors such as working under time pressure or high cognitive load can promote
reliance on system-1 thinking (Fennis et al., 2009). In UX practice, such strain can be
intensified by stakeholder pressure and expectancy of financial gain, which are both
elementary in UX design (Teixeira & Braga, n.d.). Considering the many constraints that UX
designers must comply with in their creative thinking and decision-making, it would seem
plausible to assume that UX practitioners could be particularly susceptible to cognitive
biases (NNgroup, 2019) given the many types currently demonstrated (Mumford et al.,
2006, see Figure 1 for examples). Diminishing cognitive bias would enable UX practitioners
to reduce systematic errors in their work, which would ultimately benefit the users of the
products and services these specialists help design and develop.

2.2 The bias blind spot
Attempts to raise awareness of and mitigate cognitive bias already exist in the UX
professional community (Subramanian, 2018; Whitenton, 2016; Sun, 2017). One cognitive
bias, however, might eclipse the focus on addressing the many types that impact the quality
of UX practitioners’ work.
The bias blind spot is a systematic information-processing asymmetry where people are less
likely to detect bias in themselves than in others (Scopelliti et al., 2015). Several other biases
are thought to contribute to the bias blind spot. At its core lies a general tendency toward
self-enhancement, i.e., the motivation to maintain, pursue, or intensify one’s positive selfimage even when indicators such as one’s actual performance and other people’s opinions
suggest otherwise (Sedikides & Alicke, 2018). Self-enhancement drives a variety of selfrelated superiority biases. Central among these are the better-than-average bias in which
people tend to rate themselves higher than the average person (Hoorens, 1993; Alicke et al.,
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2001) and the self-serving bias where people attribute success to their own abilities and
failure to external factors (Sedikides & Alicke, 2018; Hoorens, 1993; Pronin & Kugler, 2007).
Other biases such as the introspection illusion and naïve realism can also contribute to the
bias blind spot (Pronin, 2009; Pronin & Kugler, 2007; Yan et al., 2016).
Previous work suggests that the bias blind spot is persistent in the general population
(Pronin et al., 2002). How the bias blind spot manifests itself among UX practitioners has not
been studied. This special bias would entail that these professionals are less likely to see
where and how their own types of bias impact their creative thinking and, conversely, more
inclined to detect them in others. Reducing the bias blind spot would therefore elucidate the
UX practitioners’ own proneness to cognitive bias. The resulting awareness of the types of
bias that a person is in fact susceptible to marks a necessary first step toward addressing this
error in thinking. Unduly considering one’s own decisions as less biased than those of others
could also harm the benefits of collaboration with stakeholders and peers, as one would
tend to prioritize one’s own assumedly ‘less-biased’ decisions. If this bias blind spot is also
discernible among UX practitioners, this would warrant further development of so-called
debiasing interventions for application in UX practice.

2.3 Implementation intention as a debiasing intervention
Debiasing interventions refer to procedures for mitigating human fallibility in judgment and
decision making in general. Although some have questioned their effectiveness (Oliver et al.,
2017), most studies suggest a positive effect of debiasing interventions (Arkes et al., 1988;
Shaffer et al., 2016; Ludolph & Schulz, 2018), for instance as video games (Morewedge et al.,
2015) and direct warning (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). The challenge with such interventions
is that people might be oblivious (blind) to their own susceptibility to cognitive bias
(Scopelliti et al., 2015).
As an example of a debiasing intervention, implementation intention can be designed to help
diminish the bias blind spot. It refers to an ‘if-then’ plan that a person commits to
(Brandstätter et al., 2015; Adriaanse et al., 2011). It is tailored to a situation that needs
change and specifies the current situation and the desired behavior to be performed. By
intentionally creating a conscious link between the (unsatisfactory) current situation and the
desired behavior, the anticipated goal situation becomes activated and accessible. Although
requiring conscious intent in the short term, sufficient repetition automatizes the behavior
in the long term, leading to habit formation of the desired behavior (Bayer et al., 2009;
Gollwitzer, 1999). With the ‘if-then’ plan as ingrained behavior, encountering the specific
cue to act (recognition of the situation) triggers an automatic, pre-determined behavioral
response performed without the conscious intent initially needed (Parks-Stamm et al., 2007;
Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Achtziger et al., 2008).
Implementation intentions have been shown to help reduce racial bias (Stewart & Payne,
2008) and stereotyping and prejudice (Mendoza et al., 2010; Devine et al., 2012). In the case
of the bias blind spot, the undesired situation is the systematic error in detecting bias in
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oneself as compared to others. The desired behavior is to become able to detect cognitive
bias as competently in oneself as one can in others. An implementation intention designed
to reduce the bias blind spot among UX practitioners could therefore be: “If I need to
evaluate myself, then I will consider how other UX practitioners would evaluate me.” By
committing to this implementation intention, UX practitioners should be able to offset the
asymmetry in the detection of bias in themselves versus in their peers. This leads to the first
hypothesis:
H1: Employing an implementation intention, compared to non-application, diminishes the bias blind
spot in the short term among UX practitioners.

People who rely strongly on system-1 thinking have a relatively higher risk of being biased
and are thus less inclined to correct their initial self-assessment through introspection (Pretz,
2011). Among UX practitioners, this might represent an issue when experts, given their
experience, rely on system-1 thinking more often than their less-experienced peers (Salas et
al., 2010; Shanteau, 1992). Through experience, knowledge increasingly becomes tacit via
internalization (Pretz, 2011), so increased reliance on fast judgment might have become the
norm, insofar as experts’ intuition begin to resemble recognition (Ericsson, 1996). Compared
to their less-seasoned colleagues, experienced UX practitioners could thus potentially be
more inclined to act based on their cognitive biases. Experienced UX practitioners, who are
arguably more ‘set’ in their ways, might therefore benefit most from implementation
intention as a debiasing intervention. This leads to the second hypothesis:
H2: The effect of implementation intention on the bias blind spot is moderated by years of
professional UX experience.

Guided by these two hypotheses, this paper contributes a preliminary study on the shortterm effect of implementation intention on UX practitioners’ bias blind spot when still driven
by conscious intent.

3. Method
To test the two hypotheses, an online experiment was conducted among UX practitioners
conceived inclusively as creative professionals working with UX design (Norman & Nielsen,
2020). The materials and data are available at DataverseNL (de Rooij, 2022).

3.1 Participants
Two hundred eight participants initially participated (see 3.5 for the recruitment process).
Seventy-six did not complete the study, six failed the manipulation check, and two were not
UX practitioners. Data from 123 UX practitioners was used in the analysis (Mage = 29.86,
SDage = 5.45, 65 self-identified females, 53 males, 5 did not say). Sixty-eight percent of the
participants were UX designers, 17% UX researchers, 8% UX strategists, 4% others (UX Team
Lead, UX Manager, SEO), and 3% did not fill in their professional role. Nationalities included
42% Dutch and 18% Romanian, while 40% represented 32 other nationalities. Participants
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had various levels of UX experience. Nineteen percent had less than one-year of experience,
29% had one-three years of experience, 18% three-five years, and 36% had more than five
years of experience. Two percent did not say. The study was approved by the TSHD Research
Ethics and Data Management Committee, Tilburg University.

3.2 Manipulation of implementation intention
Participants were randomly asked to undergo an implementation intention treatment
(experimental group) or not (control group). The experimental group was asked to read
silently to themselves: “If I need to evaluate myself, then I will consider how other UX
practitioners would evaluate me” (see above for the underlying rationale). They then ticked
a box with the commitment to act upon this intention (Achtziger et al., 2008). Given the
short duration of the study, the effect of this commitment was assumed to be driven by
conscious intent rather than habituation (Gollwitzer, 1999). To check if participants
committed to the implementation intention during the study, they were asked to respond to
this follow-up question: “At the beginning of the study you were asked to read and commit
to a statement. What was that statement?”. Data from participants who failed this
manipulation check was not included in the analysis (see 3.1).

3.3 Establishing and assessing the bias blind spot
To establish and later assess a possible bias blind spot, participants were presented with five
hypothetical situations (randomized) in which a cognitive bias occurred. The cognitive biases
were the anchoring bias, sunk cost fallacy, status quo bias, confirmation bias, and framing
effect (explained in Figure 1). The relevance and selection of these biases and situations
were based on anecdotal evidence from the UX domain (Subramanian, 2018; NNgroup,
2019) and confirmed in an informal pilot study with five UX practitioners. The bias stimuli
were designed as follows: 1) each situation would state the existence of the given cognitive
bias as confirmed by the research that this study builds on to support construct validity; 2)
an assumingly typical UX design process situation was described to support external validity;
and 3) a consequence of the bias was described regarding the previous situation to support
both construct and external validity (see Figure 1 for details).
After being presented with a situation, participants rated the following statements on a
seven-point Likert scale (1 = extremely unlikely; 7 = extremely likely): “To what extent are
you likely to exhibit this tendency?”; 2) “To what extent is the average UX practitioner likely
to exhibit this tendency?” This approach, which follows Scopelliti et al. (2015), enabled
testing of any difference in the cognitive bias detected in the participants themselves versus
in others. This difference served as a proxy to indicate the degree of a bias blind spot that a
participant might have. Given the many possible types of bias one might be susceptible to
(Mumford et al., 2006), no reliable ‘gold-standard’ approach exists for accurately measuring
broad constructs such as the detection of cognitive bias in the self and others. Latent
variables based on the selected five biases were therefore assumed to be a domain-relevant
proxy to assess cognitive bias and the bias blind spot among the UX practitioners.
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Figure 1. The five situations of the five cognitive biases including definitions (top) in a UX context,
presented in random order to the participants: A) Anchoring bias (Sugden et al., 2013), B)
sunk cost fallacy (Arkes & Ayton, 1999), C) status quo bias (Samuel & Zeckhauser, 1988;
Kahneman et al., 1991), D) confirmation bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), and E) framing
effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).

3.4 Years of professional experience
Participants were asked to report their number of years of professional UX experience using
a four-point ordinal scale (1 = less than 1 year; 2 = 1-3 years; 3 = 3-5 years; 4 = 5 years or
more). This categorization supported the ease and speed of participation online to prevent
increasing attrition.
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3.5 Procedure
To recruit participants, a personalized invitation was sent to LinkedIn users who selfidentified as UX designers, UX researchers, or UX strategists in their profile text. They were
also asked to share the study within their network. Additionally, an advertisement was
posted on three Slack UX groups (MediaMonks2, UX Goodies, BetterUX Community) and one
LinkedIn group (UX Professionals). The experiment started when participants opened a
Qualtrics survey link provided to them in the invitation or advertisement. Informed consent
was established, and instructions were provided without revealing the true purpose of the
study. Participants were randomly assigned to the control or the experimental group. The
experimental-group participants underwent the implementation intention procedure. All
participants were presented with the five cognitive biases and self-reported to which degree
each bias applied to them or the assumed ‘average UX practitioner’ (others) (Figure 2).
Demographics were reported and the manipulation check was completed. The survey ended
with a full debriefing and a note of thanks for the participants’ time and effort.

Figure 2. Example of the stimulus (left) and assessment of the bias blind spot (right) as presented
during the online experiment.

3.6 Analytical strategy
The data were analyzed with R 4.0.2 and Lavaan 0.6-7 (Rosseel, 2012). Two structural
equation models (SEM) were calculated. SEM provides a flexible framework for testing the
effects of the manipulation (implementation intention) and moderator (experience) on a
latent variable drawn from the bias-related measurements. Normality of the data was
checked by visually inspecting histograms. If a deviation from normality was suspected, the
appropriate corrections for the test statistics were applied to prevent type I and type II
errors (Rosseel, 2012). Models were only accepted for presentation if the model fit indices
would indicate an acceptable model fit or were adapted accordingly (Kenny, 2020). The first
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SEM was calculated to test a potential difference in detected bias between the self and the
‘average UX practitioner.’ If a bias blind spot among the UX practitioners was confirmed, this
would justify calculating the second SEM to further test any effects of the implementation
intention (H1) and experience moderation (H2) on the bias blind spot.

4. Results
To test if the UX practitioners perceived more bias in others than in themselves, a multilevel
structural equation model was calculated on the non-debiased control group data (n = 64).
The within-subject level was specified to test for any difference between the perception of
cognitive bias in the self or in others (coding self = 0; others = 1). Cognitive bias was specified
as a latent variable that comprised of the anchoring bias, sunk cost fallacy, status quo bias,
confirmation bias, and framing effect. The between-subject level was saturated by covarying all cognitive bias measures since no hypothesis was tested at this level with this
model (Rosseel, 2012). Visual inspection of the histograms of the measures of these five
biases suggested that their distribution deviated from normality. Therefore, the HuberWhite corrected test statistics were reported (Rosseel, 2012). Model fit indices suggested a
good model fit (Table 1, Note) (Kenny, 2020). All bias measures significantly and positively
loaded onto the latent variable cognitive bias (Table 1, latent variable). The results showed
that the participants perceived significantly more bias in others than in themselves, b = .715,
p < .001 (see Figure 3 and Table 1 for details). These findings justified further investigation of
whether implementation intentions might be deployed to mitigate UX practitioners’ bias
blind spot.

Figure 3. Visual model of the difference in perception of cognitive bias in the self and in others––the
bias blind spot. Data are unstandardized coefficients. a denotes a reference value. ** p <
.010, *** p < .001
Table 1. Results of the multilevel structural equation model of the difference between perceived
cognitive bias in the self and in others.
B
Latent variable
Cognitive bias
Anchoring bias
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Sunk cost fallacy

2.037

.593

3.435

.001

Status quo bias

1.660

.366

4.532

<.001

Confirmation bias

1.819

.409

4.447

<.001

Framing effect

.638

.224

2.844

.004

.715

.171

4.177

<.001

Anchoring bias

.643

.135

4.779

<.001

Sunk cost fallacy

.745

.179

4.171

<.001

Status quo bias

1.029

.230

4.478

<.001

Confirmation bias

.369

.105

3.522

<.001

Framing effect

.411

.091

4.530

<.001

Cognitive bias

.117

.082

1.423

.155

Regression
Cognitive bias ~ Self or Others
Variances

Note: Data are unstandardized coefficients (B), standard errors (SE), z-values (z), and p-values (p). Model fit indices:
Comparative fit index = .965; Root mean square error of approximation = .086; Standardized root mean square error of
approximation = .060. a denotes a reference value. The table presents the within-subjects results only for the participants in
the non-debiased control group. Intercepts for the five biases are all set to zero.

To test if implementation intention diminished the confirmed bias blind spot among the
participating UX practitioners, and if this was moderated by professional experience, a
second structural equation model was calculated. The model featured implementation
intention (coding control group = 0; experimental group = 1) as the independent variable
and a latent variable to represent bias blind spot. This latent variable comprised of the
difference scores (Δ) between the bias perceived in others and the bias perceived in the self
for the anchoring bias, sunk cost fallacy, status quo bias, confirmation bias, and framing
effect. The use of Δ’s prevented the need for calculating cross-level interactions in multilevel
SEM, which was not supported by the software (Rosseel, 2012). Professional experience was
specified as a moderator of the effect of implementation intention on the bias blind spot.
Although no hypothesis was formulated about a direct effect of professional experience on
the bias blind spot, this was included in the model, as no acceptable model fit could be
obtained without it. Visual inspection of the histograms of the bias Δ’s suggested they did
not meet the assumption of normality. Therefore, the bootstrap-corrected (n = 1,000) test
statistics were reported (Rosseel, 2012). Model fit indices suggested a good model fit (Table
2, Note) (Kenny, 2020). All bias Δ’s significantly and positively loaded onto the latent variable
bias blind spot (Table 2, latent variable). The results showed a significant and negative effect
of implementation intention on the bias blind spot, b = -.663, p = .033. However, the results
showed no significant moderation effect of professional experience on the effect of
implementation intention on the bias blind spot, b = .166, p = .092, and no significant direct
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effect of professional experience on the bias blind spot, b = .003, p = .957 (see Figure 4 and
Table 2 for details).

Figure 4. Visual model and results of the effects of implementation intention on the bias blind spot,
and the moderation of this effect of years of professional experience in the UX industry.
Data are unstandardized coefficients. a Denotes a reference value. † p < .100, * p < .050, **
p < .010
Table 2. Results of the structural equation model of the effects of implementation intention on bias
blind spot, and the moderating role of years of professional experience.
B

SE

z

p

Latent variable
Bias blind spot
ΔAnchoring bias

1.000a

Δsunk cost fallacy

1.652

.503

3.283

.001

Δstatus quo bias

1.406

.478

2.942

.003

Δconfirmation bias

2.082

.607

3.432

.001

Δframing effect

.624

.272

2.298

.022

Bias blind spot ~ Implementation
intention

-.663

.310

-2.137

.033

Bias blind spot ~ Professional experience

.003

.063

.054

.957

Bias blind spot ~ Implementation
intention x professional experience

.166

.099

1.685

.092

Δanchoring bias

.962

.140

6.888

<.001

Δsunk cost fallacy

1.501

.243

6.168

<.001

Δstatus quo bias

1.946

.282

6.908

<.001

Regressions

Variances
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Δconfirmation bias

.881

.235

3.748

<.001

Δframing effect

.913

.123

7.405

<.001

Bias blind spot

.192

.095

2.009

.045

Note: Data are unstandardized coefficients (B), standard errors (SE), z-values (z), and p-values (p). Model fit indices:
Comparative fit index = .994, Root mean square error of approximation = .014, Standardized root mean square error of
approximation = .051. a denotes a reference value.

5. Discussion
5.1 Main contribution
The study was conducted to preliminarily explore if implementation intention can be
deployed as a debiasing intervention to diminish the bias blind spot among UX practitioners
in the short term. The results suggested that the participating UX practitioners did perceive
more bias in the so-called ‘average UX practitioner’ than in themselves, and that this bias
blind spot could be diminished during the experiment by committing to the implementation
intention (if-then plan): “If I need to evaluate myself, then I will consider how other UX
practitioners would evaluate me.” This finding thus confirmed the first hypothesis (H1);
namely that deployment of an implementation intention, compared to non-application, can
diminish the bias blind spot in the short term among these UX practitioners. However, the
findings showed no evidence for hypothesis (H2); i.e., that the effect of implementation
intention on the bias blind spot was moderated by years of professional UX experience.
These results align with research suggesting that the bias blind spot is prevalent in the
general population (Pronin et al., 2002) and demonstrate that UX practitioners are no
different in that regard. This is unsurprising. More importantly, this study may be the first to
suggest that an implementation intention can be designed to help debias UX practitioners’
bias blind spot short-term; that is, when the effect of the deployed implementation intention
is still driven by conscious intent as opposed to habituation (Gollwitzer, 1999; Parks-Stamm
et al., 2007; Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Achtziger et al, 2008). These results also add the bias
blind spot to the list of cognitive biases alongside racial biases (Stewart & Payne, 2008) and
stereotyping and prejudice (Mendoza et al., 2010; Devine et al., 2012) and others that can
indeed be targeted and mitigated with tailored implementation intentions.
These results thus contribute new insight to the design research community and the UX
professional community. Especially the latter seems to focus increasingly on cognitive biases
in UX and on finding efficient debiasing interventions to help UX practitioners become even
more aware of and skillful at mitigating the cognitive biases that mostly severely affect their
profession (NNgroup, 2019; Subramanian, 2018; Sun, 2017; Whitenton, 2016). In our view,
this enhanced attention to biases specifically among UX practitioners is not fully represented
in the current body of work in the design research community.
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5.2 Limitations
The study has various limitations. Firstly, as with any online experiment, there are limitations
to the external validity of the results. As such, there is some uncertainty about the degree to
which the results apply to situations that occur in professional practice. The results should
not be taken as definitive, but as indicative as an incentive to conduct further research.
Secondly, a common issue with online experiments is attrition. In this study, seventy-six
people started but did not complete the experiment. Because the reasons for noncompletion are unknown, selection bias cannot be ruled out. This might affect the study’s
internal validity. Thirdly, the ordinal scale used to capture experience could, theoretically,
introduce ceiling effects due to the five+ years category. Inspection of the data, however,
suggested this was unlikely. Fourthly, the use of difference scores could threaten the
construct validity of the blind spot measure (Peter et al., 1993). This means that negative
scores are possible, indicating the perception of more bias in the self than in others, which
would comprise the opposite of a bias blind spot. However, confirming a bias blind spot
among UX practitioners (Figure 3, Table 1) before further testing did largely rule out this
potential limitation.

5.3 Implications and future work
The present preliminary study is conceived as a first look into ways in which UX practitioners
can be equipped with the knowledge and tools they need to address their cognitive biases.
Speculatively, becoming aware of and initiating proper measures to debias the bias blind
spot could be seen as a soft skill among UX practitioners to improve investigations into and
decision-making about user needs, especially when collaborating closely with stakeholders
and peers, which is typical in UX. Ultimately, cultivating this soft skill would be an asset for
UX practitioners when trying to maximize the end users’ perceived benefits from interacting
with the numerous UX-based products and services that characterize everyday life.
The results of the present study should therefore be considered an incentive to take a
second and third look.
A second look is necessary to establish the long-term efficacy of implementation intention as
a debiasing intervention for the bias blind spot among UX practitioners. A key advantage of
implementation intention compared to current debiasing interventions, e.g., video games
(Morewedge et al., 2015), ‘considering the alternative’ (Mussweiler et al., 2000), and direct
warning (Lewandowsky et al., 2012), is its potential for long-term effects (see Mussweiler et
al., 2000; Madva, 2017). Although the present study only points to its short-term effects
driven by conscious intent, research suggests that with sufficient repetition, implementation
intentions can be automatized and become habitual (Gollwitzer et al., 1999; Parks-Stamm et
al., 2007; Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Achtziger et al., 2008). Therefore, the potential longterm effects of implementation intention evoke a type of debiasing skill that becomes
subconscious and effortless over time. Further research should examine if this is the case.
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A third look is equally important. A motivational factor for adopting implementation
intention is that using it brings tangible benefits at a reasonable cost. Its relative ease and
limited cost and time investment suit an environment where practitioners often work under
time pressure and high cognitive load (Fennis et al., 2009; Teixeira & Braga, n.d.). As for the
benefits, the working hypothesis is that the bias blind spot gets in the way of realistically
detecting one’s own susceptibility to cognitive bias. This obliviousness leaves potentially
harmful cognitive biases unaddressed, which, ultimately, might be detrimental to the quality
of the products and services that UX practitioners help create. Whether (literally) bringing
into view one’s own susceptibility to cognitive bias is sufficient for enabling UX practitioners
to act upon their improved awareness remains an open scientific question and a practical
problem.
The tighter an implementation intention is aligned with a situation, the larger the chance of
successful debiasing (Gollwitzer, 1999). Therefore, in practice implementation intentions
could be designed with further specificity regarding the human-centered UX design process
(e.g., empathy, idea generation) and the people involved (e.g., peers, stakeholders, users)
and integrate specific state-of-the-art design theory. Concretely, this goal could be
materialized in UX design education and later as part of professional design training
programs. Multiple implementation intentions tailored to specific UX situations would
therefore likely be needed to become gradually more aware of one’s own susceptibility to
cognitive bias and to actively address the types of bias that most palpably hamper the
quality of a UX practitioner’s work.
With this preliminary study, we hope that the design research community might be inspired
to look even closer at the bias blind spot and some of the debiasing interventions that seem
most promising for mitigating this issue in contemporary professional UX design practice.
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